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The Unassertability of  Contextualism
Martijn Blaauw




There are many versions of  epistemological contextualism. They all share the 
idea that the truth- conditions of  knowledge sentences depend on the con-
versational context of  the attributor of  knowledge. But they differ in what 
shifts with context and how the shift operates. On Keith DeRose’s version of  epis-
temological contextualism, what shifts with the conversational context of  
the attributor of  knowledge is how strong an epistemic position a subject 
must be in to satisfy “knows” (where a subject’s strength of  epistemic posi-
tion is determined by how far out into logical space she can track the truth), 
and how the shift operates is dictated by the “Rule of  Sensitivity.” DeRose 
originally defended his version of  contextualism by arguing that it provides 
a convincing answer to the problem of  radical skepticism and, furthermore, 
reconciles seemingly conflicting intuitions about certain puzzle cases. He has 
subsequently added a third argument for contextualism: it is powerfully moti-
vated by the knowledge account of  assertion.1
In what follows, we argue that the contextualist, in basing contextualism 
on the knowledge account of  assertion, violates the knowledge account of  
assertion whenever she asserts contextualism in the context in which it is most 
natural to do so: that of  a philosophical debate.2 This essay is structured as 
1 Keith DeRose, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context,” Philosophical Review 111, 
no. 2 (2002): 167– 205.
2 In this essay, “contextualism” will refer to DeRose- style contextualism as de-
veloped in Keith DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 52, no. 4 (1992): 913– 29; “Solving the Skeptical Prob-
lem,” Philosophical Review 104, no. 1 (1995): 1– 52; “Contextualism: An Explanation 
and Defense,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. John Greco and Ernest Sosa 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 187– 205; “Now You Know It Now You Don’t,” in 
Proceedings of  the Twentieth World Congress of  Philosophy Vol . V, Epistemology (Bowling 
69martiJn Blaauw and Jeroen de ridder
follows. In §§2– 3, we clarify contextualism, the knowledge account of  asser-
tion, and the relation between them. In §4, we present the argument against 
the assertability of  contextualism in the context of  philosophy. In §§5– 6, 
we consider four objections to our argument and find them wanting. In our 
argument against the assertability of  contextualism in the context of  philoso-
phy, the notion of  sensitivity—central to DeRose’s contextualism— plays a 
crucial role. We conclude in §7, however, by considering a modified version 
of  our argument that is phrased not in terms of  sensitivity but in terms of  
another key DeRosean notion: strength of  epistemic position.
2. Contextualism
What is the relation between knowledge and context? According to contextu-
alism, “the truth- conditions of  knowledge- ascribing and knowledge- denying 
sentences . . . fluctuate in certain ways according to the context in which they 
are uttered.”3 So on this view, a particular sentence of  the form “S knows that 
p” can be true when uttered or entertained in a nonskeptical context but false 
when uttered or entertained in a skeptical context, even if  the values of  S and 
p are kept constant across these contexts. What is crucial is that this variation 
in truth- conditions of  knowledge sentences depends on the use of  the verb 
“to know” in that knowledge sentence. Thus the main thesis of  contextual-
ism can be stated as follows:
C: Due to a characteristic of  “knows,” whether “S knows that p” is 
true depends on features of  the conversational context in which “S 
knows that p” is uttered.4
C is the denial of  what has long been the standard approach to the relation 
between knowledge and features of  the conversational context: invariant-
ism.5 According to this theory, features of  the conversational context have 
Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center), 91– 106; “Assertion,” 167– 205; The 
Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).
3 DeRose, “Assertion,” 168.
4 Cf. also DeRose, Case for Contextualism, ch. 1.
5 For a formulation of  invariantism, see Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scep-
ticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). For versions of  what is known as 
“subject sensitive invariantism,” see John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004); Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, 
Knowledge in an Uncertain World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Jonathan 
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no influence whatsoever on whether a subject can be truthfully attributed 
knowledge. Now C raises many questions, two of  the most pressing of  which 
are what shifts with changes in the conversational context and what brings about 
a shift in conversational context.
Starting with the first question, DeRose has argued that what shifts with 
changes in the conversational context is the strength of  epistemic position that 
is required for knowledge.6 Here strength of  epistemic position is defined 
in terms of  the tracking condition for knowledge, where the strength of  a 
subject S’s epistemic position depends on how far out into logical space S 
can track the truth.7 The farther out into logical space S can track the truth, 
the stronger her epistemic position will be. Now what shifts in accordance 
with the conversational context is how far out into logical space S should be 
able to track the truth in order for her to count as knowing that p. In contexts 
with low epistemic standards, for S’s belief  that p to count as knowledge, a 
fairly weak epistemic position would suffice: S only has to track the truth in 
those worlds closest to the actual world in which p is true (S would continue 
to believe p in worlds in which p is true). In contexts with high standards, 
however, for S’s belief  that p to count as knowledge, a strong epistemic posi-
tion is necessary: S has to track the truth far out into logical space, including 
worlds in which p is false. Thus in high- standard contexts, one’s strength of  
epistemic position with respect to p must be such that one’s belief  that p is 
sensitive, where a belief  is sensitive just in case the following conditional holds:
SC: If  p were not the case, S would not have believed that p.
As to the second question, DeRose captures the mechanism that brings about 
a shift in the strength of  epistemic position required for S to know p in what 
we call the “Rule of  Sensitivity”:
Schaffer’s contrastivism is a version of  invariantism, albeit one where contextual 
features do play a central role. See his “Contrastive Knowledge,” in Oxford Studies in 
Epistemology, Vol . I, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 235– 71; “What Shifts? Thresholds, Standards, or Alterna-
tives?,” in Contextualism in Philosophy, ed. Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 115– 30; and “Knowledge in the Image of  Asser-
tion,” Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 1– 19.
6 DeRose, “Skeptical Problem.”
7 The locus classicus for the notion of  tracking is Robert Nozick, Philosophical Ex-
planations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). Sherrilyn Roush, Tracking 
Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), of-
fers an updated treatment.
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RS: When it is asserted that some subject S knows (or does not know) 
some proposition P, the standards for knowledge (the standards for 
how good an epistemic position one must be in to count as knowing) 
tend to be raised, if  need be, to such a level as to require S’s belief  in 
that particular P to be sensitive for it to count as knowledge.8
Attributing knowledge to a subject and denying a subject knowledge will 
thus tend to raise the standards for knowledge so as to require the belief  
in the target proposition to be sensitive to count as knowledge.9 Given RS, 
any particular utterance of  “S knows that p” will be true if  and only if  (i) S 
believes that p, (ii) p, and (iii) S’s epistemic position is such that S’s belief  that 
p is sensitive.
Of  course, many details are left unspecified in this characterization of  
contextualism. But for assembling our argument for the unassertability 
of  contextualism in the context of  philosophy (§4), this is all we need.
3. The Knowledge Account of Assertion
What is the relation between assertion and knowledge? According to the 
knowledge account of  assertion, knowledge plays a normative role in gov-
erning what one may assert.10 Specifically, the knowledge account of  asser-
tion poses the following norm:
KAA: One ought to assert that p only if  one knows that p.11
8 DeRose, “Skeptical Problem,” 36; Case for Contextualism, 14.
9 It remains moot what will tend to lower the standards again. Duncan Pritchard, 
“Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of  Epistemic Descent,” Dialectica 55, 
no. 4 (2002): 327– 49, contains a useful discussion of  this issue.
10 The knowledge account of  assertion is defended in, for example, Unger, 
Ignorance; Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); DeRose, “Assertion”; Hawthorne, Knowledge; John Turri, “Prompting 
Challenges,” Analysis 70, no. 3 (2010): 456– 62; Matthew Benton, “Two More for 
the Knowledge Account of  Assertion,” Analysis 71, no. 4 (2011): 684– 87; Marti-
jn Blaauw, “Reinforcing the Knowledge Account of  Assertion,” Analysis 72, no. 1 
(2012): 105– 8; Martijn Blaauw and Jeroen de Ridder, “Unsafe Assertions,” Austral-
asian Journal of  Philosophy 90, no. 4 (2012): 797– 801.
11 KAA is also accepted by Schaffer, “Knowledge in the Image,” where it is used 
in an argument in favor of  contrastivism. It is, however, by no means without critics. 
See, for instance, Matthew Weiner, “Must We Know What We Say?,” Philosophical 
Review 114, no. 2 (2005): 227– 51; Igor Douven, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational 
Credibility,” Philosophical Review 115, no. 4 (2006): 449– 85; Jennifer Lackey, “Norms 
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As with most norms, there is a distinction to be made between primary and 
secondary propriety. Acknowledging this distinction, DeRose writes, “As 
happens with other rules, a kind of  secondary propriety/impropriety will 
arise with respect to [the knowledge account of  assertion]. While those who 
assert appropriately (with respect to this rule) in a primary sense will be those 
who actually obey it, a speaker who broke this rule in a blameless fashion 
(one who asserted something she didn’t know, but reasonably thought she 
did know) would in some secondary sense be asserting properly.”12 Accord-
ing to DeRose, then, even if  you did not comply with KAA because what 
you asserted was not known by you, you could still have complied with KAA 
in a weaker sense if  you reasonably believed that you knew the proposition 
you asserted. Subjects who assert falsehoods that they reasonably believe to 
be true can behave appropriately in one sense and inappropriately in another.
DeRose accepts KAA but also argues that what epistemic position we 
must be in so that we can be warranted in asserting that p is a contextual 
matter. In some contexts, one must be in a very good epistemic position to 
be warranted in asserting that p, whereas in other contexts, a lesser epistemic 
standing suffices. So even though the norm for assertion is knowledge, there 
is a contextual variation in when a subject S is warranted in asserting some-
thing. This leads DeRose to accept the following thesis:
CV: What epistemic position one must be in so that one can be war-
ranted in asserting that p is a context- variable matter.
DeRose now continues to argue that CV and KAA imply C. If  the norm for 
warranted assertion is knowledge and if  our ordinary practices display a flexi-
bility with respect to what epistemic position one ought to be in so that one 
can warrantedly assert a proposition, then there must be a flexibility in what 
knowledge is as well. Here is DeRose himself  on this point: “The knowl-
edge account of  assertion provides a powerful argument for contextualism: 
If  the standards for when one is in a position to warrantedly assert that P 
are the same as those that comprise a truth- condition for ‘I know that 
P,’ then if  the former vary with context, so do the latter. In short: The knowl-
edge account of  assertion together with the context- sensitivity of  assertabil-
ity yields contextualism about knowledge.”13 And so KAA combined with 
of  Assertion,” Noûs 41, no. 4 (2007): 594– 626; Sanford C. Goldberg, Assertion: On the 
Philosophical Significance of  Assertoric Speech (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
12 DeRose, “Assertion,” 180.
13 Ibid., 187.
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CV— that is, the recognition that there is a contextual variation in when it is 
appropriate to assert something— support contextualism about knowledge.14
A complication here is that, given CV, DeRose cannot accept KAA as 
it stands. For DeRose, “knows” has many different senses and does not 
denote one property in all contexts. What it takes for “S knows that p” to be 
true depends on the conversational context of  the attributor of  knowledge. 
Accordingly, DeRose must hold that KAA actually expresses different norms 
in different contexts. Here is how DeRose contextualizes the knowledge rule: 
“To be positioned to assert that p, one must know that p according to the 
standards for knowledge that are in place as one makes one’s assertion.”15 
And so we arrive at the knowledge account of  assertion contextualized in 
DeRose’s own formulation (2009, 99):
KAAC: A speaker, S, is well- enough positioned with respect to p to be 
able to properly assert that p if  and only if  S knows that p according to 
the standards for knowledge that are in place as S makes her assertion.16
This, in a nutshell, is DeRose’s argument for contextualism. How could 
anyone rest a “madly swaying distinction [i.e., the conditions for warranted 
assertability, MB & JdR] upon a stubbornly fixed foundation [i.e., the truth- 
conditions for ‘S knows that p,’ which invariantism holds to be fixed, MB & 
JdR]?”17
Again, many details are left unspecified in this characterization of  KAA. 
But for assembling the argument for the unassertability of  contextualism in 
the context of  philosophy, this is all we need. It is to this argument that we 
now turn.
4. The Unassertability of Contextualism
The argument for the unassertability of  contextualism in the context of  phi-
losophy runs as follows:
14 Adam Leite, “How to Link Assertion and Knowledge without Going Con-
textualist: A Reply to DeRose’s ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Context,’” Philosophical 
Studies 134, no. 2 (2007): 111– 29, contains a useful discussion of  DeRose’s argument 
from KAA to contextualism.
15 DeRose, “Assertion,” 182.
16 DeRose, Case for Contextualism, 99. See Schaffer, “Knowledge in the Image,” 
for a similar rule geared to fit his contrastivist treatment of  the norm of  assertion.
17 DeRose, Case for Contextualism, 101.
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 (1) Contextualism (C)
 (2) Knowledge account of  assertion contextualized (KAAC)
 (3) A subject S should assert contextualism in the context of  philoso-
phy only if  “I know that contextualism is true” is true for S in that 
context. [from 2]
 (4) In the context of  philosophy, the standards for knowledge require 
S’s belief  that contextualism is true to be sensitive for it to count as 
knowledge.
 (5) S’s belief  that contextualism is true is not sensitive.
 (6) In the context of  philosophy, “I know that contextualism is true” is 
false for S. [from 4 and 5, modus tollens]
 (7) Hence S ought not to assert contextualism in the context of  phi-
losophy. [from 3 and 6]
The argument is valid. (1) and (2) are just the assumptions that contextualism 
and the knowledge account of  assertion contextualized are true, and (3) is 
the application of  KAAC to our particular assertion. Hence DeRose should 
find (1) through (3) uncontroversial. Only (4) and (5) stand in need of  further 
support.
Starting with premise (4), it maintains that the standards for knowledge 
in a philosophical discussion are at least as demanding as when the word 
“know” is uttered, thus requiring belief  in a philosophical position to be 
sensitive for it to count as knowledge. But why would that be? We offer two 
motivations.
First, it is predicted by the nature of  philosophical inquiry. Philosophy 
is an activity that is characterized by (among other things) precision, rigorous 
argumentation, and the continuous search for new error- possibilities, including remote ones. 
Like other academic disciplines, it is a systematic search for knowledge with 
the highest attainable degree of  justification by means of  the best methods 
available to us. The level of  scrutiny is immensely high in the context of  
philosophy. Not so high that it is required that the philosopher eliminate all 
skeptical scenarios in order to know her philosophical position— indeed, this 
isn’t a requirement for scientific knowledge in general. But high enough that 
it is required for knowledge that the philosopher be able to eliminate error- 
possibilities for her philosophical position and thus track the truth in a broad 
range of  possible worlds, including some in which her philosophical position 
is false. What’s more, in epistemology in particular, the nature of  knowledge is 
investigated. So arguably the word “knowledge” lingers over any epistemo-
logical debate. That brings to mind RS, albeit implicitly.
Second, contextualists have argued that the truth conditions of  knowl-
edge attributions are affected not only by RS but also by the stakes (the costs 
of  being wrong). In the well- known Bank Cases, for instance, the subject is 
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correctly attributed knowledge in the first Bank Case but is correctly denied 
knowledge (of  the very same proposition) in the second Bank Case only 
because the stakes have changed from low to high.18 We maintain that the 
stakes are indeed high in the context of  philosophy. Not in the sense that 
the costs of  being wrong are bankruptcy, divorce, or suicide, but in the sense 
that the costs of  being wrong are (partially) incorrect views about issues of  
fundamental importance: the fundamental nature of  reality and ourselves. 
The reason we do philosophy is to understand ourselves and the world. 
Clearly this matters a lot to humans, or we wouldn’t have stayed at it for 
millennia. So we conclude that the standards for knowledge in a philosoph-
ical discussion are high or at least that they are as high as in contexts where 
the word “know” is explicitly uttered.19 In philosophy, our beliefs need to be 
sensitive to be instances of  knowledge.
The question then is the following: Is S’s belief  that contextualism is 
true sensitive? In defense of  premise (5), we offer two motivations. First, 
philosophy is extremely difficult. Many questions and issues that philoso-
phy deals with are close to the limits of  what our cognitive capacities have 
a grip on. The history of  philosophy shows this. Most substantive positive 
philosophical theses have both historical and contemporary proponents and 
opponents of  formidable intelligence, who offer powerful arguments for 
and against those theses. A very natural explanation for this is that we aren’t 
very receptive to philosophical facts. They are elusive. Nothing guarantees 
that our philosophical beliefs generally track the truth to any significant 
degree, like, for instance, our perceptual beliefs. Because of  this, the contex-
tualist’s belief  is very unlikely to be sensitive.
Second, consider the notion of  an epistemic peer that has become famil-
iar from discussions about the epistemic significance of  disagreement.20 
18 The Bank Cases were introduced in DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge 
Attributions.”
19 Arguably, the fact that philosophy means “love of  wisdom” already puts seri-
ous philosophical discussions under the spell of  that most demanding of  epistemic 
states.
20 See, for instance, Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of  Disagree-
ment,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol . I, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John 
Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 167– 96; David Christensen, 
“Epistemology of  Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 116, no. 2 
(2007): 187– 217; Richard Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreement,” in Philos-
ophers without Gods, ed. Louise Antony (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
194– 214; Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield, eds., Disagreement (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); and David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, eds., The Epis-
temology of  Disagreement: New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), for 
influential contributions to this debate.
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The notion of  an epistemic peer can be characterized by the following two 
principles:21
Evidential equality: A and B are evidential equals relative to the question 
whether p when A and B are equally familiar with the evidence and 
arguments that bear on the question whether p.
Cognitive equality: A and B are cognitive equals relative to the question 
whether p when A and B are equally competent, intelligent, and fair- 
minded in their abilities to assess the evidence and arguments that 
bear on the question whether p.
With respect to the contextualism/invariantism debate, some philosophers 
defend (forms of) contextualism, while others defend (forms of) invariant-
ism. What is crucial to our defense of  (5) is that the philosophers engaged 
in this debate— or at least some of  them on either side— are epistemic peers 
and ought to recognize each other as such. They share the same evidence and 
they are cognitive equals.
Now if  one evaluates sensitivity’s counterfactual condition, one consid-
ers the nearest possible world in which p is false— the world in which p is false 
but that is otherwise as similar to the actual world as possible— and then tries 
to determine whether, in that world, S believes that p. If  S does believe that p 
in that world, then her belief  that p is insensitive. If  S does not believe that 
p in that world, her belief  is sensitive.
How does the contextualist’s belief  that contextualism is true fare with 
respect to this evaluation? Suppose, for the sake of  argument, that this belief  
is indeed true in the actual world. Now consider the nearest possible world 
in which contextualism is false but that is otherwise as similar to the actual 
world as possible— call this world w. We will now have to try to determine 
whether the contextualist believes that contextualism is true in w.
Given the fact that some of  the contextualist’s epistemic peers do not 
believe that contextualism is true in the actual world in which contextual-
ism is indeed true, it seems plausible that the contextualist wouldn’t believe 
that contextualism is false in w. The situation is entirely symmetrical. So if  
invariantists are liable to make the mistake of  believing their position to be 
true in a world in which it is false, then contextualists will be just as liable 
to make the same mistake with respect to their position. The reason for this 
is that the actual world and w will be highly similar from an evidential point 
of  view. After all, a number of  the contextualist’s peers take the evidence 
in the actual world to support invariantism. They are aware of  contextual-
ism and the arguments in its support, but they have objections to them and 
21 See Kelly, “Epistemic Significance,” 174– 75.
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offer their own rival arguments in favor of  invariantism. A world in which 
contextualism is true can thus look very similar to one in which invariantism 
is true, so the nearest world in which contextualism is false, w, will certainly 
look very similar to one in which it is true. Hence it is easy, even for highly 
trained and capable epistemologists, to mistake a world in which the evidence 
supports contextualism for one in which it supports invariantism. But then 
something analogous will be true for the nearest world in which contextual-
ism is false— that is, world w. In that world, the contextualist is likely to make 
the mistake of  taking the evidence to support contextualism when it in fact 
supports invariantism. The evidence for and against philosophical positions 
is extremely subtle. Why would the contextualist have special access to the 
philosophical facts and be responsive to these subtle differences in the avail-
able evidence in ways that her epistemic peers are not? We conclude that the 
contextualist’s belief  that contextualism is true is not a sensitive belief.22
With premises (4) and (5) thus supported, the argument looks solid.23
5. Replies Rejected
How might the contextualist reply? We initially anticipate the following 
three objections, the first of  which is to say that even though it would be 
inappropriate in the primary sense to assert contextualism, it could still 
be appropriate in a secondary sense to do so. We would respond, first and 
foremost, that even if  asserting contextualism could be appropriate in a sec-
ondary sense, this only eases the pain without taking it away. Strictly speaking, 
we are still not allowed to assert contextualism in philosophical contexts. But 
more important, we submit that asserting contextualism is inappropriate in 
both senses. It is inappropriate in the primary sense because the act of  assert-
ing contextualism while contextualism isn’t known to be true violates the 
knowledge account of  assertion; it is inappropriate in the secondary sense 
because it seems unlikely that DeRose can reasonably believe that he knows 
22 See Sanford C. Goldberg, “Reliabilism in Philosophy,” Philosophical Studies 142, 
no. 1 (2009): 105– 17, for similar arguments to the effect that our belief- forming 
methods in philosophical matters are not reliable.
23 After having written this essay, it came to our attention that Christoph Jäger, 
“Contextualism and the Knowledge Norm of  Assertion,” Analysis 72, no. 3 (2012): 
491– 98, presents a different argument for a similar conclusion, to wit that the posi-
tion that combines contextualism and KAA (as DeRose’s contextualism does) can-
not coherently be stated. His argument, however, crucially relies on two principles 
that we do not assume: one is a contextualized principle about the factivity of  knowl-
edge, the other an epistemic closure principle. Hence his and our arguments are 
complementary.
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that contextualism is true in light of  the many problems that his epistemic 
peers have identified for contextualism.
The second reply the contextualist might give is an indifferent shrug: the 
problem we have mounted against contextualism is a problem for any philo-
sophical view. Given KAA, no philosophical view can ever be asserted in the 
context of  a philosophical discussion. What’s so special about contextualism? 
We grant that contextualism isn’t special in being the only philosophical posi-
tion that is vulnerable to the objection we have introduced in this essay. But 
it is special in that it is allegedly powerfully motivated by KAA. If  our objection 
is correct, contextualism is powerfully motivated by an account of  assertion 
that at the same time forbids it from being asserted in that context in which 
it most naturally and relevantly should be asserted.
The third objection is to deny that our argument establishes any signifi-
cant result because no philosopher ever wants to assert her philosophical 
position in the context of  a philosophical discussion. Instead, philosophers 
merely hypothesize their favored positions to be true, hold them up for 
consideration, tentatively entertain them, provisionally accept them, or take 
some other noncommittal cognitive attitude toward them.24
We reply that this construal of  philosophy is too deflationary. It is at 
odds with how philosophers conceive of  what they are doing as expressed 
through their typical behavior in speech and writing. They write papers to 
argue for philosophical theses, and some of  them even develop book- length 
arguments to defend their favored positions. They sometimes develop a 
strong commitment to a philosophical claim and get excited when they see 
a novel argument for that claim or irritated when they spot a problem for 
it. Some of  them spend entire careers, or substantial parts of  it, developing 
and defending a view. These are clear indications that philosophers do take 
committal cognitive attitudes toward those philosophical theses they take to 
be true and that their utterances of  them are most naturally understood as 
assertions.25 The characteristic phraseology one finds in philosophical papers 
and books provides further evidence. Philosophers defend positions, establish 
claims, argue that so- and- so is the best solution to a philosophical problem, 
give compelling arguments, offer strong reasons, and conclude that such- and- such 
is correct, the best explanation, a superior account, and so on. Indeed, consider 
what DeRose himself  says about contextualism: it is “the correct solution 
24 Goldberg, Assertion, thinks that these are indeed the typical attitudes philos-
ophers take toward their views. Since he also maintains that philosophers do assert 
their views, he rejects KAA and proposes replacing it by a context- sensitive norm.
25 Of  course, this is not to deny that philosophers also frequently take various 
noncommittal cognitive attitudes to certain philosophical theses.
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to the puzzle [the Argument from Ignorance] confronts us with”;26 it “can 
finally solve this perennially thorny philosophical problem.”27 Other candi-
date solutions to the skeptical puzzle result from “a failure to see the truth 
of  contextualism”;28 the contextualist solution is “the best resolution of  our 
puzzling conflict of  intuitions.”29 To interpret all of  these and similar locu-
tions as something weaker than assertions of  a philosophical thesis surely 
goes against the plain sense of  words. So we conclude that the third reply is 
unconvincing as well. Philosophers, or at least some of  them, do assert philo-
sophical positions. If  a position cannot coherently be asserted in the context 
of  philosophy, that is a significant blow against it.30
6. One More Reply Rejected
A fourth and final objection is to deny premise (5) and argue that a contextual-
ist’s belief  in the truth of  contextualism is sensitive, since contextualism— like 
many other philosophical theses— is, if  true, necessarily true. Beliefs in neces-
sary truths trivially satisfy SC because its antecedent is never actualized. If  p is 
a necessary truth, then there are no possible worlds in which p is false. Hence 
the sensitivity condition (“If  p were not the case, S would not have believed 
p”) is always satisfied. We have several lines of  response to this objection.
The first and most important thing to note is that if  belief  in necessary 
truths is indeed trivially sensitive, then this is an embarrassment for SC: it 
means that knowledge of  necessary truths comes too easy.31 Hence there 




30 Logan Paul Gage called our attention to the fact that DeRose himself  explores 
the issue of  assertions in philosophical contexts in his new book The Appearance of  
Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2018), briefly in chapter 4 and more fully in appendix C. Although he doesn’t 
fully commit, he appears to favor a view on which (a) there isn’t much knowledge 
to be had in philosophy, (b) we nonetheless make assertions, but (c) operate under a 
“pretense of  knowledge” when doing so. Sometimes, however, we need to “get real” 
and lift the pretense, for instance in response to challenges questioning whether a 
speaker really knows what she asserts. A fuller evaluation of  this proposal must await 
another occasion, but for now it suffices to note that— pretense aside— our conclu-
sion stands: asserting contextualism in philosophy violates the norm for assertion 
that is supposed to be an important motivation for the view.
31 This problem led Nozick himself  to abandon the sensitivity requirement for 
knowledge of  necessary truths. See Ernest Sosa, “How to Defeat Opposition to 
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is initial reason to doubt that this objection has much force. Defending 
the assertability of  contextualism in philosophical contexts by exploiting a 
problematic feature of  the sensitivity condition doesn’t seem like an attrac-
tive dialectical strategy.32 But suppose, for the sake of  argument, that some 
suitable modification of  sensitivity can be devised on which belief  in neces-
sary truths comes out as sensitive but not trivially so.33 Is it indeed plausible 
to think of  contextualism as a necessary truth?
To the extent that contextualism is a linguistic thesis about the word “know” 
and its cognates, its truth cannot be necessary. Facts about how words are 
used in a language are highly contingent due to the conventional nature of  
language. Just as the word “know” could have meant something entirely 
different, it also seems possible that the truth conditions for knowledge- 
attributing sentences would not have shifted with context.
Alternatively, contextualism can be construed as a thesis about the concept 
of  knowledge. This is what DeRose himself  alludes to when he empha-
sizes that contextualism is not just a piece of  philosophy of  language but 
has profound importance for epistemology34 and explicates contextualism as 
claiming that “knowledge” has many different senses.35 On such a construal, 
the contextualist could maintain with some plausibility that contextualism 
expresses a conceptual and hence necessary truth about the concept of  
knowledge.
We don’t believe, however, that this suggestion has much going for it. 
First, as we have noted before, the current epistemological scene features 
knowledgeable and intelligent philosophers who deny that contextualism 
is true. They defend invariantism of  various sorts. This state of  affairs is 
a strong indication that, given what we know about the world and about 
knowledge attributions specifically, contextualism is not the only possibility. 
It looks as if  invariantism represents a possible way knowledge attribu-
tions could have worked. Given that this is the way things look and absent 
independent reasons to deny it, we have good reason to suppose that there 
are possible worlds in which the concept of  knowledge behaves as invarian-
tists say.
Moore,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 141– 53, 146.
32 DeRose is aware of  this problem for Sensitivity and appeals to the notion of  
“strength of  epistemic position” to handle knowledge of  necessary truths. See his 
“Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses,” in Sosa and His Critics, ed. John 
Greco (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 22– 41. We return to this in the next section.
33 Cf. Roush, Tracking Truth, 134– 47, for a sophisticated attempt.
34 DeRose, “Contextualism: Explanation and Defense,” 188– 89.
35 Ibid., 191– 92.
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Second, whether the truth conditions for knowledge attributions shift 
with conversational contexts would seem to depend on what the world is 
like naturally and socially. There is a relationship between the way the world 
is and the way the concept of  knowledge and the word “knowledge” func-
tion. Therefore, the truth of  contextualism cannot be necessary. In possible 
worlds with relevantly different physical or social characteristics, contextual-
ism could be false and invariantism true.36 To see this, consider the following 
examples of  possible worlds in which contextualism appears to be false.37
Consider a possible world in which we have vastly superior cognitive 
abilities— we’re as close to being omniscient as is possible for beings who are 
spatiotemporally limited. As a result, we know the things we know with high 
degrees of  confidence and tend to have maximal justification for what we 
know. We hardly make mistakes and believe virtually no falsehoods. In such 
epistemically optimal conditions, it seems implausible that the truth condi-
tions for knowledge ascriptions would shift with conversational context. After 
all, no matter what the conversational context, we always satisfy demanding 
epistemic standards. There is no reason why the truth conditions for knowl-
edge sentences would be sensitive to context.
As a second example, imagine a possible world physically very similar 
to ours but with different sociolinguistic conventions. There may be worlds 
in which people are extremely risk- averse in epistemic matters. They only 
ascribe knowledge when people have indubitable beliefs of  the kind Descartes 
thought was required for knowledge. In these worlds, even in low- standards 
contexts where one is in a relatively strong epistemic position with regard to 
a proposition, linguistic conventions dictate that one not ascribe knowledge 
to oneself. There may also be worlds where the conventions vis- à- vis “know” 
license what seem to us extremely liberal and unwarranted knowledge ascrip-
tions. Minimally justified beliefs all get to be called knowledge, no matter 
what the conversational context. People in these worlds have no problem 
at all saying that we can know the denials of  skeptical hypotheses, even in 
a philosophical discussion. Being raised on their lax linguistic conventions, 
they don’t share our intuitions with regard to the appropriateness of  the use 
36 See Stephen Hetherington, “Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to In-
clude Justification?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75, no. 1 (2007): 41– 69, 
for an analogous argument to the effect that knowledge doesn’t necessarily include 
justification.
37 Note, however, that nothing in particular hangs on the details of  these ex-
amples; they only serve to make plausible the general claim that the truth of  contex-
tualism (or other claims about knowledge attributions) depends on the contingencies 
of  the natural and social world.
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of  “know.” In such worlds, contextualism would be false. Since such worlds 
seem to be genuinely possible, contextualism isn’t necessarily true.38
As a final resort, the contextualist might propose that contextualism 
is not a necessary truth of  the conceptual variety but an a posteriori neces-
sary truth of  the sort Kripke familiarized us with. She might propose that 
“knowledge” is a rigid designator for the concept of  knowledge that figures 
in contextualism. Just as it is necessary that water is H2O, it is necessary 
that knowledge is what contextualism says it is, or so this proposal main-
tains. Although there may be possible worlds in which people use “knowl-
edge” to refer to an invariant relation, these worlds aren’t worlds in which 
contextualism is false. Rather, they are worlds in which something other than 
the contextualist’s notion of  knowledge occupies the role played by knowl-
edge in our world (just as XYZ occupies the role of  watery stuff  in possible 
worlds in which watery stuff  is not H2O). We could call this knowledge- y 
stuff  schmowledge. According to this proposal, then, the reason that contextu-
alism is necessarily true is that in possible worlds where schmowledge occu-
pies the knowledge- role and is the referent of  “knowledge,” knowledge is still 
what the contextualist says it is in the actual world, even though schmowledge 
is not. Hence there are no possible worlds in which knowledge and knowl-
edge attributions do not behave as contextualism has it.
In response to this proposal, we reply, first, that, to the best of  our 
knowledge, contextualists have neither claimed nor defended that “knowl-
edge” is a rigid designator. So it would at least be a surprising result that 
contextualism requires this to be so. Moreover, the view that knowledge is a 
natural kind is not a popular view.39 Because rigid designators typically latch 
onto natural kinds, this speaks against “knowledge” being a rigid designator. 
Furthermore, the core idea of  contextualism— that “know” has many differ-
ent senses— is at odds with “knowledge” being a rigid designator. A rigid 
designator serves to pick out one and the same thing in all possible worlds 
in which that thing exists. That is something a word with many different 
senses cannot do. Suppose “water” has many different senses that shift with 
context. In one context it means H2O; in another it might mean hydrogen 
peroxide, H2O2; and in yet another heavy water, D2O. Such facts would seem 
38 It is no objection to point out that in the worlds described, the contextualist 
would not believe contextualism. The point of  these examples was not to estab-
lish that there are nearby worlds in which contextualism is false but still believed to 
be true by contextualists (for this, see section 3), but to show that the truth of  con-
textualism is not necessary.
39 A notable dissenter is Hilary Kornblith, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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to preclude “water” from being a rigid designator, precisely because it no 
longer picks out one and the same thing across possible worlds.40
Fortunately, however, it doesn’t matter where we come down on this 
issue because even if  “knowledge” were a rigid designator and the truth 
of  contextualism a posteriori necessary, a version of  our argument still goes 
through. To see this, we must consider how contextualism could be a neces-
sary a posteriori truth.41 If  “knowledge” were a rigid designator, a sentence 
describing the central contextualist claim, such as “The truth conditions 
for knowledge attributions are context- sensitive,” would express a neces-
sary truth because “knowledge” picks out our actual notion of  knowledge in 
every possible world in which this notion exists. But now note that this is just 
one of  two possible ways to think about how the term “knowledge” applies to 
the world. The first, and presumably most natural, way to think about it is 
to take our world to be the actual world. If  we do so, and we assume for the 
sake of  argument that contextualism is true in our world, the result is what 
we just described: “knowledge” applies to the contextualist notion of  knowl-
edge that occupies the role of  knowledge in our world because this contextu-
alist notion is “the knowledge- y stuff  of  our acquaintance.” Another way to 
think about it, however, is to consider what the word “knowledge” would apply 
to under the hypothesis that another world than our world is actual. Had a world where 
schmowledge occupies the knowledge- role been actual, the term “knowledge” 
would have applied to the invariantist schmowledge because in such a world, 
schmowledge would have been the knowledge- y stuff  of  our acquaintance, 
which we would have baptized “knowledge.”
This shows that there is an important sense in which the truth of  
contextualism is not necessary, even if  “knowledge” is supposed to be a rigid 
designator. If  we go by the second way of  thinking about the intension of  
“knowledge,” the truth of  contextualism is contingent. If  another possible 
world than our world had been actual, “knowledge” could easily have applied 
to an invariantist notion of  knowledge. Hence on this understanding, the 
sentence “The truth conditions for knowledge attributions are context- 
sensitive” may well have been false and is therefore not a necessary truth.
40 Alvin Goldman, “Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and 
Their Epistemic Status,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 74, no. 1 (2007): 1– 26, 17, ex-
presses a similar worry.
41 What follows is inspired by the two- dimensional modal logic treatment of  
necessary a posteriori truths found in David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of  
a Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 56– 65; and Frank 
Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of  Conceptual Analysis (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998), ch. 3.
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The upshot of  the previous discussion is that the truth of  contextualism is 
not a necessary truth. Hence the fourth objection fails too. Contextualism 
cannot plausibly be construed as a conceptual truth, nor is it plausible to 
think of  it as an a posteriori necessary truth in the Kripkean sense. And even 
if  its truth were a posteriori necessary, it would still be contingent in another 
important sense.
7. A Modified Argument: Sensitivity vs. 
Strength of Epistemic Position
In replying to the fourth objection, we started out by noting that necessary 
truths are a problem for SC because belief  in a necessary truth trivially sat-
isfies it. The contextualist would do well, therefore, not to insist on SC for 
the case of  necessary truths. In this final section, we consider what happens 
if  the contextualist adopts a different criterion for appropriate knowledge 
ascriptions in high- standards contexts. Since our argument in its present for-
mulation hinges on the contextualist’s belief  being insensitive, this is a press-
ing matter.
In fact, DeRose himself  proposes a further criterion, next to sensitivity. 
In a paper in which he compares and contrasts his sensitivity condition with 
Ernest Sosa’s safety condition, he emphasizes that, for him, it is ultimately 
strength of  epistemic position— and not sensitivity— that matters for knowledge, 
although a failure to satisfy Sensitivity does often provide a correct explana-
tion of  why people lack knowledge.42 Strength of  epistemic position is to 
be understood in terms of  one’s beliefs matching the facts of  the matter or 
tracking the truth in the relevant sphere of  (nearby) possible worlds.43 This 
is importantly different from sensitivity. Whereas sensitivity only concerns 
one’s belief  about p in possible worlds where p is false, strength also takes into 
account one’s belief  in worlds in which p is true. Unlike the sensitivity of  one’s 
belief  in a certain truth, then, the strength of  one’s epistemic position with 
regard to a proposition can be upset by the presence of  nearby possible 
worlds in which that proposition is true but one fails to believe it.
What this means is that our whole argument can also be put in terms of  
strength of  epistemic position instead of  sensitivity. As follows:
 (1) Contextualism (C)
 (2) Knowledge Account of  Assertion Contextualized (KAAC)
42 DeRose, “Sosa, Safety.”
43 DeRose, “Skeptical Problem,” 34; “Sosa, Safety,” 33– 35.
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 (3) A subject S should assert contextualism in the context of  a philo-
sophical discussion only if  “I know that contextualism is true” is 
true for S in that context. [from 2]
 (4′) In the context of  a philosophical discussion, in order for S’s belief  
that contextualism is true to count as knowledge, S needs a strong 
epistemic position.
 (5′) S isn’t in a strong epistemic position vis- á- vis the belief  that contex-
tualism is true.
 (6) In the context of  a philosophical discussion, “I know that  
contextualism is true” is false for S. [from 4 and 5, modus tollens]
 (7) Hence S ought not to assert contextualism in the context of  a phil-
osophical discussion. [from 3 and 6]
The defense of  (4′) and (5′) would mostly run along the same lines as that of  
(4) and (5) because insensitivity and strength are closely connected. Insensi-
tivity of  someone’s belief  detracts from the strength of  that person’s epis-
temic position. So by showing someone’s belief  to be insensitive, one also 
shows her epistemic position to be compromised.
In defense of  (5′), however, an additional consideration can be added. 
If  p is true in the actual world, then the strength of  S’s epistemic position 
with regard to p is upset by the presence of  nearby worlds in which p is still 
true but S fails to believe that p. This is particularly pertinent to the present 
discussion. If  we assume, again, that contextualism is true in the actual world, 
it seems that the contextualist could have easily failed to believe that contex-
tualism is true in a nearby world in which it is true. Given that there are well- 
informed and competent epistemologists who believe that invariantism is 
true (and hence that contextualism is false) in the actual world, it is extremely 
plausible that someone who believes that contextualism is true in the actual 
world could believe that invariantism is true in a nearby world in which, say, 
she received a somewhat different training in philosophy or had followed 
a different research trajectory. After all, these worlds would be extremely 
similar as far as the relevant evidence is concerned, perhaps even indistin-
guishable. It follows that the contextualist’s epistemic position with regard to 
contextualism isn’t very strong— not strong enough to count as knowing in 
the context of  a philosophical discussion.
Putting the argument in terms of  strength of  epistemic position also 
evades the fourth objection, which turned on the idea that the truth of  
contextualism is necessary and that belief  in it is therefore automatically 
sensitive. Since SC only looks at worlds in which a proposition is false, neces-
sary truths come out as trivially sensitive because the antecedent of  the crite-
rion (if  p were not the case) is never actualized. No such shortcut is available 
for strength of  epistemic position, since nothing whatsoever guarantees 
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that one will automatically be in a very strong position with regard to neces-
sary truths. If  one fails to believe a necessary truth in nearby worlds, one’s 
epistemic position with regard to that truth will be weak. So even if  our reply 
to the fourth objection would turn out to be unsuccessful, our revised argu-
ment in terms of  strength of  epistemic position still goes through. Even if  
contextualism is a necessary truth after all and the contextualist is prepared 
to bite the bullet on the trivial sensitivity of  belief  in necessary truths, she 
still wouldn’t be off  the hook. Her epistemic position vis- à- vis contextualism 
is too weak to count as knowing in the context of  a philosophical discussion 
and, therefore, in asserting contextualism she would violate KAAC.
If  it has these advantages, one might wonder why we didn’t formulate 
our argument in terms of  strength of  epistemic position in the first place. 
The reason is that, in our opinion, using that notion would have introduced 
unnecessary vagueness into the discussion because it invites questions 
about the exact strength that is required throughout various contexts, the size 
of  the relevant sphere of  possible worlds, and the right ordering of  worlds in 
that sphere. In contrast, focusing on sensitivity provided a clear- cut crite-
rion and effectively sidestepped these difficult questions. In addition, of  
course, DeRose himself  insists that in most cases, the insensitivity of  a belief  
provides the correct explanation of  why that belief  fails to constitute knowl-
edge. Hence showing that the contextualist’s belief  that contextualism is true 
is insensitive is a good argument for the conclusion that “I know that contex-
tualism is true” is false for the contextualist in a philosophical discussion, 
even if it is admitted that ultimately, strength of  epistemic position is the 
crucial notion.
8. Envoi
Bringing the preceding points together, what moral emerges from the discus-
sion in this essay? Not that contextualism is false. Not that the knowledge 
account of  assertion is false. Not even that contextualism cannot be based on 
the knowledge account of  assertion. What emerges is that if  contextualists 
base their theory on the knowledge account of  assertion, they can no longer 
coherently assert their own theory in the most natural and appropriate con-
text: that of  philosophy.44
44 Thanks to audiences at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the University of  
Geneva, and the University of  Aberdeen. We are particularly grateful for comments 
from Peter Baumann, Jessica Brown, Igor Douven, Logan Paul Gage, Hilary Korn-
blith, Duncan Pritchard, Ram Neta, Jonathan Schaffer, and Matt Weiner.
